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The global financial crisis triggered in 2007-08 by the collapse ofthe US suhprime 
mortgage market has dramatically revived the discussion 00 financial regulation 
in industriaJized economies. Generalized regulatory failure and forbearance 
have been blamed by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the !MF, 
as a majar factor of the excess risk taken up by banks. 1 Confidence in market­
based self·reguiation has been shaken as intemal systems of risk control failed to 
prevent the accumulatíon ofenonnous losses in intemational banks ofthe highest 
reputation. As Lawrence Surnmers, a forrner Secretary of Treasury under the 
Clinton Administration, has admitted, 'it should be recognized that to a substantial 
extent self-regulation is deregulation. AlIowing institutions to detennine capital 
levels based on risk models of their own design is tantamount to letting thero 
set their own capital levels. We have seen institutions hurt again and again by 
events to which their models implied probabilities ofless than one in a million',2 
The effectiveness of prudential regulation to discipline bank managers has been 
severely questioned, namely on grounds of their motivation. 'Those of us who 
have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders' 
equity, myse!f inc1uded, are in a state of shocked disbelief,' former chairman of 
lbe FEO, Alan Greenspan, told a Congressional hearing-' 
The limils of financia! supervision have been revealed by the SEC's failure to 
detect giant pyramida! frauds Iike Bemard MadofT's in time. Yet only few months 
earlier, the Bush Administration's Treasury Secretary and fonner chainnan of 
Goldman Sachs. Henry Pau!son, blamed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. enacted after 
the wave of corporate and accounting scandals of 2001, for 'excessive regulation', 
calling for a Iighter regu!atory touch' But many of those who, back in lhe long 
boom of the 1990s, staunchly opposed tougher regulation on derivatives have 
now confessed that the business of spreading risk through financial engineering 
has got out of control. The extraordinary characteristics ofthe present crisis have 
required extraordinary interventions by the authorities. In the USA, the Federal 
1 Financia/ Times, 25 September 2008. 
2 Financia/ Times, 1 June 2008. 
3 New York Times, 23 October 2008. 
4 New York Times, 27 luly 2008. 
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Reserve's safety nel has for the first time been extended to investment banks. 
80th in the USA and in Europe, governments have rushed to arrange emergency 
plans with massive injections oftaxpayer money to recapitalize ailing institutions 
and preserve the public's confidence in the banking system. Whatever its gravity 
and duration, the crisis has put into a radically new perspective the long wave 
of financiai deregulation that started in industrial and emerging economies at the 
end ol' lhe 1970s. There can be no doubl lhal lhe regulalory regime 01' finaneial 
serviees on bolh shores of lhe Allanlie will emerge profoundly reshaped by the 
global crisis. 
How did we gel here? Whal faelors have driven the ebb and flow ol'finaneial 
regulation over the last two centuries? What lessons can we draw from the past 
regarding the impact offinancial crises 00 the regulatory attitude ofgovemments? 
And whal has hislory lo say about lbe making of finaneial regulation and 
deregulation? 
Two theoretical approaches compete to explain the historie cycles of financia1 
regulation, arre based on a public-interest motivation and another arre emphasizing 
the role ofprivate interests. In the public-interest view, governments are conceived 
of as benevolent social planners which intervene to regulate and oversee financia1 
systems when informal rules of practice and self-regulation (i.e. market rules 
collectively administered by market actors) prove incapable of preventing market 
inefficiencies. The special features of banking intennediation make financiai 
institutions particularly vulnerable to crises. They act as delegated monitors of 
borrowers 00 behalfofdepositors and confront problems ofadverse selection (ex ante 
screening) and moral hazard (ex post monitoring). The bank-depositor relationship 
also entails a moral hazard problem, as banks have incentives to increase leverage 
(thus operating on 10w capital-deposit ratios) in order to increase retums on equity. 
Leverage, 'transfonnation' (tuming liquid deposits into ilIiquid asscts) and asset 
opaqueness expose them to runs and panics with potentially systemic extemalities.5 
Therefore, policymakers are called upon to intervene in order to ensure the safety 
and soundness of the management of risky assets by the banking system, and to 
prevent contagion effects that may disrupt the working of the payment and credit 
systems, thus leading to systemic crises and social welfare losses. 
This economic rationaJe underlies the concept ofbanking as a matter ofpublic 
interest and has justified traditional means ofprudential regulation, such as capital 
requirements to create a buffer against losses, as well as to act as a disciplinal)' 
device for banks' risk-taking. Motivations ofthis sortare alsoadvanced for structural 
regulations such as controls on bank chartering and restrictions on entry aimed at 
preventing disruptive competition. By increasing the franchise value of licensed 
or incumbent intennediaries, these are assumed to limit bankers' incentives to take 
D.W. Diamond, 'Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring'. Review o/ 
Economjc Studjes, 51 (1984), pp. 393--414; D.W. Diamond and P.H. Dybvig, 'Bank Runs. 
Deposit Insurance and Liquidity', Journal o/Political Economy, 91, 3 (1983), pp. 401-19. 
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risks and encourage a cautious conduct ofbusiness.(' Likewise, the introduction of 
deposit insurance serves to promote financial stability, by protecting uninformed 
depositors and preventing panics. However, deposit insurance carries high costs in 
tenns ofweakened market discipline, given that depositors and debt-holders have 
iess incentive to monitor banks, up to the point where they become indifferent 
between solvent and insolvent institutions. In addition. they magnify moral hazard 
since managers may increase leverage and asset risk to maximize shareholder 
value, thus in fact maximizing the value of the insured subsidy.7 A deposit 
insurance scheme therefore requires a prudential regulation of banks' risk-taking 
complemented by sorne supervision of the banking system by public authorities 
(mainly bul nol exc1usively perl'ormed by eenlraI banks) in lhe form of regular 
disclosure ofbalance sheets and on-site inspections. 
In the same vein, imperfections and failures in markets for financia! assets 
provide an economic rationale for regulating capital markets. Risk-taking by 
individual finns can generate negative extemalities for other finns and individuals 
that are not their counterparties. Market discipline is insufficient to deal with 
the social costs of disrupted financial market activities and the ensuing loss of 
wealth and output. Likewise. private finns have incentives that limit the amount 
and lhe quality of information lhey provide lo lbe publie, as lhe social benefil 
of infonnation is greater than the private benefit to those who produce it. This 
justifies govemment intervention in its multiple fonns - from public Iicensing 
of market intennediaries to disclosure requirements and prohlbition of insider 
trading ~- in order to discipline risk taking, assure transparency and deter frauds, 
manipulations and other fonns of misconduct. 8 Historically, the regulatory and 
supervisory reforms promoted by the Roosevelt Administration during the Oreat 
Depression - fmm the Glass-SleagalI Ael of 1933 lo lhe Seeurities Ael and lhe 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933-34 - are ofien regarded as paramount examples 
ofpublic imervention aiming at limiting the sociallosses offinancial instability. 
The competing view of financia1 regulation to this one has been developed 
by a recent tradition of theoretical and empirical research based on a political­
economy approach. In this approach, financial regulation can be interpreted as 
the outcome of a policy-making process in which special interests with different 
objective functions and political infiuences compete to use the coercive power of 
the state in order to appropriate rents. This literature considers politics and political 
institutions as the main drivers of the laws, regulations and controls which atIect 
the financial system.lt investigates how the preferences ofpoliticians and interest 
groups may enhance - or hinder- financial development and infiuence the financial 
6 M.e. Keeley, 'Deposit lnsurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking'. American 
Economic Review, 80, 5 (1990), pp. 1183-2000. 
7 M. Klausner, 'Bank Regulatory Reform and Bank Structure', in M. Klausner, 
L.J. White (eds). Stroctural Change in Banking (Homewood IL, 1993). 
8 R. Dodd, The Economic Rationale for Financial Market Regulation, Financial 
Policy Forum, Special Policy Report no. 12.2002. 
,
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decisions of corporations, the working of the banking sector and the operation of 
financial markets. 9 Legal and poli tical reforms can be modelled as ao outcome of 
the interplay of governments and policyrnakers wilh incumben! interests within a 
set of institutional mechanisms which may range from corruption to iobbying, up 
to the capture ofthe policy-making process by economicalIy entrenched groups. 
Recent sludies explore how political institutions throughout the 19th and 20lh 
centuries managed the confiict of ¡nteres! which is endemic in the relationship 
between the state and the financia1 system. 00 the ane hand, this involves the role 
of the government in strengthening the rights of private financial clairnholders 
through the enforcement of financial contracts. On the other, it focuses on the 
capture of financial markets and intermediaries as a source of government 
revenue. lO In this perspective, the rise ofinterstate branching prohibition and entry 
barriers - a manifestation of an 'abiding fear ofbigness'll so distinctive ofthe US 
banking system - can be explained as a consequence of the large dependence of 
states' finances on bank chartering and other bank-related revenues, and successful 
rent-seeking by local bankers. 12 Likewise, the introduction of Federal Deposit 
Insurance in 1933, far from being an emergency measure principally aimed at 
protecting smalI depositors in the tunnoil of the Oreat Depression, represented a 
politicaJ victory of smal!, unstable unit banks which had vainly advocaled federal 
legislation on banks' liability insurance for half a century.13 
The political-economy approach also puts the regulation of financial markets 
in a ditIerent perspective. Sorne contend, for instance, that the 'Blue Sky Laws' 
9 M. Pagano, P. Volpin, 'The PoliticaJ Economy of Finance', Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 17,4 (2001). pp. 502-19; S. Haber, R. PerottL The Political Economy 01' 
Financial Systems, Timbergen lnstitution Discussion Paper, no. 045/2, 2008. 
111 H. Bodenhorn, State Ranking in Early Arnerica. A New Economic History (Oxford, 
2003) and id., 'Bank Chartering and Political Corruption in Antebellum New York. Free 
Banking as Refonn', in E. Glaeser and e. Goldin (eds). Corrllption and Reform. Lessons 
frorn America's Econornic Hislory (Chicago, 2006), pp. 231-57. See also S. Haber. A. 
Razo and N. Maurer, The Polilics of Property Rights. Politica/ Instability, Credibll! 
Cornrnílments, and Econornic Gmwlh in Mexico 1876-1929 (Cambridge, 2003), and the 
papers collected in S. Haber, D.e. North and B. Weingast (eds), Politicallnslitutions and 
Financial Development (Stanford, 2007). 
11 1.1-1. Kareken. 'Federal Bank Regulatory Policy. A Description and Sorne 
Observations', The Journal nI Business, 59, 1 (1986), pp. 3--48, p. 6. 
e The seminal contributions on this jssue are E.N. White, 'The Political Economy 
of Banking Regulation, 1864-1933', lOl/rnal of Economic Hisfory, 42. 1 (1982), pp. 
33-40; and id., The Regll/alion and Reform {JI/he American Ranking Syslern, 1900-1929 
(Princeton, 1983). See also N. Econornides, RG. Hubbard and D. Palia, 'The Political 
Economy of Branch Restrictions and Deposit Insurance', Journal ofLaw and Economics, 
29 (1996), pp. 667-704. 
11 e.A. Calomiris and E.N. White, 'The Origins ofFederal Deposit Insurance', in e. 
Goldin and G. Libecap (eds), The Regu!ated Econorny. A Historical Approach lo Political 
Econom)' (Chicago, \994), pp. 145-88. 
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enacled by several American slales belween 1911 and 1933 to regulate the 
offer and sale of securities to the public were not so much a device to address 
widespread frauds as rather the result of bankers' political pressure Lo limit the 
threat ofdisintermediation brought home by the development ofsecurities markets. 
Likewise, sorne fealures of the Securities Act of 1933, typically regarded as a 
'full disclosure' statute, can be properly understood as a means to protect separate 
wholesale and retail investment banks from the competition of integrated firms. '4 
Finally, the political-economy approach also pays attention to how limited 
government and democratization were positively, although not monotonically, 
related to financia1 development in the nineteenth century - eroding entry barriers 
and broadening the access to finance- in both the USA r5 and Europe. 16 From this 
point ofview, the degree ofpolitical participation is considered a critical element 
that ínfiuences polítical decisions over finance. Research suggests that the narrower 
the social basis of political regimes - such as those under suffrage restrictions 
or autocracies - the more exetusionary is hkely to be the ensuing regulatory 
regime. Democratic, infonnation-rich and transparent environments may allow 
the voice of advocates of public interest to be heard, whereas in weak democratic 
institutions, incumbent interests are better positioned to capture the process of 
regulation and policy-making. 17 This would explain why autocratic regimes tend 
to increase regulatory restrictions on financia} markets and intermediaries, as wel J 
as to establish state control over finance in order to maximize their borrowing 
powers and constrain the emergence of competing power centres. Monopoly 
rights, barriers to entry or regulations can thus be used to grant rents to connected 
elites and incumbent interests in return of polítical support, thus favouring the 
emergence of an oligopolistic structure of financial systems. Within autocratic 
regimes, lobbying and regulation capture can be enhanced by the absence of 
political rights, the opaqueness of the law-making process and the concentration 
14 P.G. Mahoney. 'The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws. A Tesl of Competing 
Hypotheses', Journa! ofLaw and Ecoflornics, 46, 1 (2003). pp. 229-51; and idem. 'The 
Polítical Economy ofthe Securities Act of 1933', Journal olLegal Swdies, 30,1 (2001), 
pp. 1-31. 
l~ J. Wal1is, R. Sylla and 1. Legler, 'The Interaction of Taxation and Regulatíon in 
19th Century US Banking', in C. Goldin and G. Libecap (eds), The Regulated Economy. A 
Historical Approach lo Political Econorny (Chicago, 1994), pp. 122--44; E. Benmelech and 
T. Moskowitz, The Political Econorny of Financial Regulation. Evidence frorn US State 
Usury Laws in the 18th and 19th centuries, NBER Working Paper no. 12851, 2007. 
16 K. Ng, 'Free Banking Laws and Barriers to Entry in Banking, 1838-1860', Journal 
ofEconomic Hislory, 48, 4 (1998), pp. 877-89; 1.L. Brosz and R.S. Grossman, 'Paying for 
Privilege. The Political Eeonomy of Bank of England Charters, 1694-1844', Explorations 
in Economic History, 41,1 (2004), pp. 48-72; N. Lamoreaux and J..L. Rosenthal, Corporale 
Govemance and the Plight ofMinority Shareholden; in the US before the Great Depression, 
NBER Working Paper no. 10900, 2004. 
17 E.H. Feijen and E. Perotti, The Politieal Eeonorny of Financial Fragi1ity, CEPR 
Discussion Papen; no. 5317, 2005. 
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of political powers, as recent studies of financia1 reguJalion in Tsarist Russia, 
Porfirian Mexico and Franco's Spain seem lo suggest. 18 
Sorne of the essays collected in this volume suggest Ihal the Iwo approaches 
should not be considered as mutual1y exclusive. Indeed. financial regulation can, 
ayer the long run, be thought of as a dynamic process driven by a continuous 
teosiao between public and private interests. Historically. financia} and banking 
erises were afien interpreted as signals of market failures and provided critical 
focal points for public debates and paliey makers' interventions. However, 
the outcome in terms of legislation and regulation was shaped by historically­
determined and country-specific institutions (the legal framework, the nature of 
the state, the articulation of the political system) within which the interplay of 
private interests took place. 
In the first chapter, Phil Cotlrell ('CollServalive abroad, liberal al ¡'ome ': 
British Banking Regula/ion during Ihe Nineteenrh Cenlury) analyses the interaetion 
of different constituencies in the evolving regulation of banks in the first half of 
the nineteenth century in response to recurrent commereial erises. In a system 
dominated by private banking houses, the rise 0f joint-stoek banks, permitted 
after 1826, was perceived by many as a risky innovation sinee, as in Samuel 
Gumey's words, 'business was best conducted personalIy by those whose entire 
fortunes were at risk'. The preservation of unlimited liability, the introduction of 
mínimum capital requirements and the existence oflarge controllíng sharehoIders 
answerable to depositors were debated as regulatory instruments to safeguard the 
holders ofbanks' liabilities against possible abuses. At the same time, restrictions 
on the geographieal expansion of joint-stock banks were discussed to preserve 
the Bank of England's privileges in the London metropolitan area and to limit 
competitíon between oId and new banks. Cottrell describes how the political 
clash between incumbents and new entrants led in 1833 to the rejection by the 
House ofCommons of the compromise proposed by Chancellor ofthe Exchequer 
Althorp for chartered note-issuing joint-stoek banks. The chapter also describes 
how regulations and restrietions designed foc chartered colonial banks helped set 
a new regulatory framework for domestic banks in the aftermath of the joint-stoek 
banking 'mania' ofthe late 1830s. This led to the so-caHed 'onerous regulation' 
included in the Joint Stock Banking Act of \844 in spite of the active and critical 
involvement of the banking community in the design of the new legislation. 
The infiuence of prívate ínterests in detennining cross-country differences 
in bankruptcy procedures ís the subject of Paolo Di Martino's contribution in 
18 B. Anan'ich, 'State Power and Finance in Russia, 1802-1917', in R. Sylla et al. 
(eds), The Stale, the Financial System and Economic Modernization (Cambridge, 1999), 
pp. 210-23; N. Maurer and A. Gomberg, 'When the State is Untrustworthy. Public Finance 
and Private Banking in Porfirian Mexico', Journal of Economic History, 64, 4 (2004), 
pp. 1087-1107; N. Maurer and S. Haber, 'Related Lending and Economic Performance. 
Evidence from Mexico', Journal of Economic History, 67, 3 (2007), pp. 551-81; S.A. 
Perez, Ranking on Privilege. The Politics ofSpanish Financial Reform (Ithaca, 1997). 
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chapter 2 (Lobbying, [nstitulhmal [nerlia, and Ihe Efficiency lssue in Stale 
Regulalion: Evidence from the Evolution ofBankruplcy Laws and Procedures in 
Ita/y, England. and Ihe US (c. 1870-1939)). Historically, bankruptcy laws have 
had to find a difficult balance. On the one hand, they are concemed wilh the 
proteetion of ereditors' rights, which guarantees ex ante the availability of eheaper 
and more abundant eredit to firms, but can generate ex post ineffieieneies and 
social eosts due to frequent finn liquidations. On the other, strong protection of 
debtors may enhance ex ante moral hazard but generates ex post efficiency gains 
by preventing or reducing debt overhang, unnecessary liquidation of collateral 
and negative extemalities to third parties (such as customers and employees). Di 
Martino argues that in the interv.rar period experts both in the United States and 
ltaly perceived the British regulation ofbankruptcy as 'optimal', thanks to soundly 
regulated debt discharge, efficient use of friendly settlement and the public nature 
ofprocedures. In both countries, however. bankruptcy laws deviated substantially 
from the British pattem as a consequenee of considerations of political economy. 
In the USA the political infiuence ofthe pro-deblor lobby led to a Bankruptcy Law 
which gave more emphasis to debt diseharge than to protecting creditors' rights. In 
tum, in ltaly the strong pro-creditor legal tradition of Ihe Napoleonic code proved 
criticaI in shaping the attitude of lawyers and lawmakers, thus failing to enact 
efficient a1tematives to firrn liquidation. 
In chapter 3, Eugene White (RegulationafUiGovernance: A Secular Perspecli~'e 
on Ihe Developmenl of Ihe American Financial S,}'slem) suggests that major 
tuming points in the history of US financial regulation can be better explained as 
adjustments to produetivity shoeks in the real economy than as responses to crises. 
Technological changes related to!he 'New Economy' ofthe 1920s challenged the 
existing institutions and financiaI techniques. These were based on a 'pyramided 
structure of reserves and correspondent balances link[ing] thousands of small 
banks with incompletely diversified loan portfolios [Ihal] left the financial system 
particularly subiect to shocks'. Uncertainty about the expected retum on capital­
intensive investment earried out by vertically-integrated big business magnified 
inforrnation asymmetries in the financia} sector. making it harder for traditional 
banks to sereen and monitor borrowers. The rise of speeialized investment 
banks. such as JP Morgan, and rating agencies provided market infonnation that 
mitigated the probIem of monitoring by investors. At the same time, existing 
regulation constrained the ability of commercial banks to cope with the ongoing 
transfonnations. This Ied them to develop separate security affiliates to overeome 
geographic restrietions and earry out their investment banking business, with the 
result that they evolved towards a universal-banking patlern. In the tunnoil ofthe 
Great Depression, these universal banks were blamed for abuses and manipulations 
- an accusation vindieated by recent researeh. lndeed the market considered 
universal banks more trustworthy than independent investment banks, and much 
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of the criticism raised during Congressional hearings proved ill founded.'~ The 
Glass-Steagall Act was less a response to market fail ure than a víctory of the 
powerful lobby of investment bankers. Likewise, the 'loosely organized cartel 
with barriers to entry and price controls' that resulted traro the Banking Acts of 
1933-35 protected lhe rents of smaJl unit banks by preventing the consolidation 
and geographical diversification of large banks. As White explains, '[lhe crisis] 
made it difficult to identify lhe real problems ofthe financial system and ( ... ) left 
the door open to actroit political entrepreneurs wilh their pet schemes'. 
Since the interwar period and until the 19705, financia1 regulatian in 
inctustrialized economies has gane far beyond traditional prudential rules. With 
few exceptions (West Germany most notably), European governments extensively 
made use of paliey instruments sueh as compulsory and non-remunerated reserve 
requirements, cash and liquidity ralios, interest-rate controls, credit ceilings 
and directives On credit allocation. Such regulations were implemented either 
by suasion, as in the case of the UK,2° or more ofien by command-and-control 
administrative instructions. In sorne cases, such as ltaly and France, this escalation 
was reinforced by government ownership ofmajor banks, which gave the State an 
unprecedented pervasive role in intermediating and allocating capital. Damestíc 
regulation was afien complemented by external controls on foreign exchange and 
capilal markets embedded in the regulatory design of the Brellon Woods system. 
They became a pennanent feature of many European financial systems, with 
West Gennany províding the only counter-example of precocious Iiberalizatíon 
- aJthough briefly reversed in the early 1970s." 
Usually, the bulk ofthe regulatory framework (both domeslic and extemal) was 
inherited from the interwar periodo New constraints were, however. introduced in 
the 1960s and 1970s as a way to enhance monetary management. Central banks 
in this periad in Europe diverged as to targeting options (money, domestic credit, 
exchange rate) and ofien chose combined approaches.12 In any case, reserve 
requirements, qualitative and quantitative con trol s, and indirect controls were 
19 E.N. White, 'Before the Glass-Steagall Act. An Analysis ofthe Investrnent Banking 
Activities ofNational Banks', Explorations in Economic History, 23,1 (1986), pp. 33-55; 
R.S. Kroszner and RG. Rajan, 'Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the US 
Experience with Universal Bankíng before 1933', American Economic Review, 84, 4 (1994), 
pp. 810-32. 
20 lE. Wads\\o·orth (ed.), The Banks and the Monetary System in the UK 1959-1971 
(London, 1973), pp. 99-130. 
21 H.-J. Voth, 'Convcrtibility, Currency Controls and the Cost of Capital in Western 
Europe, 1950-1999', International Juurnal uf Finance and Economics, 8, 3 (2003), pp. 
255-76; C. Wyplosz, 'Exchange Rate Regirnes. Sorne Lessons from Post-war Europe', in 
G. Caprio et al. (eds), Financial Liberali~ation. How Far, How Fast? (Cambridge, 2001), 
pp. 125-58. 
22 A.C.F. Houben, The Evolution ofMonetary Poliq Strategies in Europe (Dordreeht, 
Boston and London, 2000), pp. 141-81. 
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deployed allegedly in order to enhance the etl"ectiveness of monetary policy 
in conlrolling domestic liquidity and bank lending. The process peaked in the 
1970s and its intensification led in many countries to a comprehensive regime of 
financial repression. This was 'a set ofpolicies, laws, regulation, taxes, distortions. 
qualitative and quantitative restrictions, which do not allow financial intermediaries 
to operate at their full technological potential'.2.l It was soon acknowledged, 
however, that such compacts of 'conduct' constraints, while preventing banking 
systems from operating efficientiy, rare[y achieved their alleged objective of 
improving efficiency in monetary management. Another general consequence was 
the underdevelopment of capital markets and the uncontested dominance of the 
government as a borrower. Yet, many European governments were generally slow 
in reforming their banking and financial systems. Why were regimes of financial 
restriction so pervasive and resilient in Europe? 
Political economy interpretations ofdomestic and external financial constraints 
emphasize their role as a potential source of revenue for governments. Arguably 
they provide access to artíficially cheap domestic funding from the banking system 
or capital markets, usually in combination with seígniorage and inflationary 
finance. This may prove especially appealing to governments with low revenues 
from income taxes as a consequence ofwidespread corruption. technicaJ or polítical 
constraints on the verification ofincome across social groups, or large underground 
economies. 24 InstitutLonal and political characteristics, such as polítical instabiJity 
or dependent central banks, may increase the government's incentive to resort 
systematically to implicit revenues, as a weak incumbent government does not 
fully ínternalize the future costs of debt servicing and may deliberately resort to 
over-borrowing.25 Empirical evidence for capital controls in a sample of20 üECD 
countries between the 1960s and the 1980s has been found to be consistent with 
an inflation-tax explanation. In addition, capital controls have also shown a close 
association with higher infiation, higher reliance on seigniorage and lower real 
interest rates in a different sample of 19 industrialized and 42 developing countries 
in the period 1966-89.26 
23 N. Roubini, X. Sala-i-Martin, 'A Growth Model of Infiation, Tax Evasion and 
Financial Repression', Journal ufMonetary Econumics. 35, 2 (1995), pp. 275-301. 
24 A. Giovannini and M. De Melo, 'Government Revenues froro Financial Repression', 
American Economic Review, 83, 4 (1993). pp. 953--63; J.P. Nicolini, 'Tax Evasion and the 
Optimal Infiation Tax', Journal ofDevelopment Economics, 55, 1 (1998), pp. 215-32. 
25 A. Alesina and G. Tabellini, 'External Debt, Capital Flight and Polítical Risk·. 
Journal oflnternational Economics, 27, 3--4 (1989), pp. 199-220. 
26 A. Alesina, V. Grilli and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, 'The Politieal Economy of 
Capital Controls' • in L. Leídennan and A. Razin (eds), Capital Mobility. The Impacf on 
Consumption, Investment and Growth (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 289-321; V. Grilli. G.M. 
Milesi Ferretti, Economic Effeets and Struetural Determinants of Capital Controls, lMF 
SraffPapers, 42,1995. pp. 517-51. 
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Adopting a different approach, Rajan and Zingales oflh a comprehensive 
interpretation ofthe inten....ar and postwarreversal offinancial markets' development 
based on an ¡nteres1 group theoryY In the increasingly closed economies of the 
1930s, incumbents (incIuding dominant banks and industrial finns) opposed 
the development of capital markets, since the latter tended to erode the value of 
incumbency and to enhance competitian, thus undermíning their own dominant 
positions. Such a reversal was strongest in Civil Law countríes since it proved 
easier there for ¡ntecest groups to influence the policy-making process and capture 
the legal system. Indeed, it was overlumed only in lhe late 20th century, when 
international trade and financia] openness rendered it unprofitable for ¡ncumbents 
to keep capital markets underdeveloped. Until then, however. Continental 
systems exhibited a long-Iasting pattern of 'relationship finance' - a facet of a 
more general 'relationship capitalism' under which governments could satisfy the 
rapidly increasing demand for social insurance stemmíng from uninsured masses. 
An alternative explanation is provided by Perotti and von Thadden, who propose 
a democratic voting modeI. This suggests that in Continental countries atlected 
by a huge inflationary shock in the post-WWl ¡¡eriod the impoverished middle 
class was hit by the devaluation of their long-tenn nominal assets and called for 
higher social insurance. This shified their electoral support towards a corporatist 
system of financial allocation and ultimately weakened financial markets and 
increased politícized control over finance. The new societal consensus in favour 
of corporatist governance and labour protection was further strengthened by the 
political changes set in motion by the Great Depression.28 
These interpretations are particularly interesting since they adopt a long-run 
perspective. The secular dimension of state intervention in the financial systems 
of Britain and France is explored in chapters 4 and 5 by Ranald Michie and Laure 
Quennouelle-Corre with André Straus, respectively. In the aftermath of WW2, 
the two countries exhibited an apparent convergence towards highly regulated 
banking systems and financia1 markets, with nationalized ccntral banks strongly 
dependent on the government, which implemented binding exchange and capital 
controls. The underlying political economy ofthe two financial systems. however, 
remained substantially ditlerent. As Michie (The London Stock Exchange and the 
British Governmenl in the Twentielh Century) argues, over the rn/entieth century 
the British Treasury interfered significantly in the operations of the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) only in emergency periods, such as the two world wars (in arder 
to fund the escalating national debt) and the abandonment of Gold Standard 
in 1931. Most binding regulations, such as increased control s on dealers and 
brokers, the prohibition of forward transactions or the imposition of minimum 
prices, were intended as extraordinary measures and reflected policy coordinatíon 
27 R. Rajan and L. Zingales, 'TheGreat Reversals. ThePoliticsofFinancial Dcvelopment 
in the 20th Century', Journal 01Financia! Eeonomies, 69, 1 (2003), pp. 5-50. 
28 E. Perotti and E.-L. von Thadden, 'The Political Econorny of Corporate Control 
and Labor Rents', Journal 01Pol¡lieal Economy, 114, 1 (2006), pp. 145-75. 
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achieved between the Treasury, the Bank ofEngland and Ihe members ofthe Stock 
Exchange. In normal periods, on the contral)', public authorities resorted to moral 
suasion and the LSE remained 'a privately owned financial inslitution exercising 
sorne control over securities and investment on behalf of the government'. This 
supervisory 'semi-officiai position' reflected an implicit bargain under which the 
government recognized the LSE as the only authorized securities market in return 
for its policing of the market and supporting national policies. The monopolistic 
rents generated by this agreement were undennined by the abolition of exchange 
and capital controls in 1979 and quickly disappeared with the full deregu1ation and 
intemationalization ofthe market afler the 'Big Bang· in 1986. 
In the case of France, the presence of the state in the financia1 system was 
much more pervasive, multifaceted and influential than in most countries. It also 
went a longer way back. Quennouelle-Corre and Straus (The State in the French 
Financial System during the Twentieth Century: A Specific Case?) interpret this 
outcome as a consequence of the nature of the French legal system and sorne 
critical economic and political events. On the capital-market side, stockbrokers 
('agents de change') were public officials appointed by the Ministry of Finance, 
with their number establíshed by law, while bankers and merchants were excluded 
from operating in the Bourse (which favoured the thriving of the unofficial, 
unregulated 'Coulisse' market). The government also supervised the activity ofthe 
market and could deny authorization for listing and issuing foreign securities. The 
banking system, in tum. was characterized by the early prominence of a number 
of 'public' channels of financial intermediatíon, such as saving banks (which 
received strong political support). postal savings and the 'Caisse de Depots et 
Consignations', a1l of which played a critical role in financial deepening. Slow 
growth and uneertainty in the 1930s paved the way for a dramatic increase in the 
direct financing ofthe govemment by the banking system. This shift was officially 
sanctioned by the heavy 'dirigiste' regulation enacted under the Vichy regime 
in 1941, which separated commercial from lnvestment banking, introduced a 
regime of official authorizatian for bank entry and branching, and brought all 
public financial intennediaries and cooperative banks under the supervision of the 
Minístry ofFinance. A peculiar!y French institution, the 'Circuit du Tresor', aimed 
at channe1ling credit from the banking system towards the Treasury, also emerged 
then. This structure served very wel1 the purposes ofpostwar 'indícatíve' planning, 
and was perfected thanks to the postwar nationalization and later cartelization 
of the largest deposit banks. The administered financial system, characterized by 
the pervasive regulation of interest rates, ensured the allocation of bank credit 
to 'priority' sectors and gave the government, state-owned institutions and local 
authorities priority in tapping domestic capital markets. 
Ever since the nineteenth century, the issue ofprudent regulation and financia] 
stability has been intimately related to the pursuit of monetary stability and the 
emergence of central banking. In Britain, lhe Joint-Stock Banking Act of 1844 
can be eonsidered a parallel outcome of the debate that led in the same year to the 
Bank Charler Act, which gave the Bank of England a monopoly on note i>sue. 
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In the USA, the Nalional Banking Acls of 1863-M combined lhe inlroduclion 
of binding rules for bank chartering under a unified federal regulalory aulhorily 
(the Comptroller of the Currency) with the introduction of a national currency. 
Bagehot's rule, according lo which cenlral banks should lend freely and quickly al 
a penalty rate to illiquid but solvent banks, gradually became conventional wisdom 
in central banking29 - although the rule too afien proves hard to follow in practice, 
and many criticize its moral hazard etl'ects, especially when emergency liquidity 
is provided systematically and unconditionally.30 The Bank ofEngland's credible 
pre-cornmitment is ofien quoted as a key determinant of the absence of major 
financia1 crises in Britain after the 18605, although sorne argue that the Lender of 
lasl Resort funclion (LüLR) made its headway in Brilish official policy only after 
WWl. 31 The reluctant and insufficient provision oflast-resort credit by the Federal 
Reserve on the outset of the Great Depression is generally blamed for the wave 
of nalionwide banking panics that shook lhe US economy in lhe early 1930s.32 
The evolution of central banks, from special commercial institutions with private 
shareholders and special privileges, to govemment banks, pooling gold reserves and 
providing rediscounting facilities, was lengthy aIld far from seamless.3.l In chapter 
6, Richard Grossman (The Emergence ofCentral Banks and Banking Supervision 
in Comparative Per~pective) reminds us that, in the nineteenth century, the key 
motivations behind the establishment of national banks (later to become central 
banks) certainly did not include any LüLR funclion. Nor was lhe Iatter performed 
necessarily by central banks, as lbe hislory of lhe USA before 1913, Canada 
and other countries demonstrates. 34 The emergence of LOLR activities between 
the late nineteenth century and the outbreak of WW l raised interesting moral­
hazard problems and had a significanl impacl on public confidence in gold-based 
monetary regimes. 35 It also provided a new economic rationale for the introduction 
19 G. Caprio and P. Honohan, Banking Crises, Institute for Intemational Integration 
Studies Trinity College Oublin, Oiscussion Paper no. 242, 2008. 
JO An exeellent introduction to this subject is X. Freixas, C. Giannini, G. Hoggarth 
and F. Soussa, 'Lender of Last Resort. A Review of the Literature', in C. Goodhart and G. 
Illing (eds), Financial Crises, Contagion, and lhe Lender ofLasl Resorl. A Reader (Oxford, 
2002), pp. 39-44. 
11 J.H. Wood, 'Bagehot's Lender of Last Resort. A Hollow Hallowed Tradition', The 
¡ndependen! Review, 7, 3 (2003), pp. 343-51. 
32 M. Friedman and A. Sehwartz, A Monelary History o/the United States 1867-1960 
(Princeton, 1963), pp. 301-59. 
33 C. Goodhart, F. Capie and N. Schnadt, 'The Oevelopment ofCentral Banking', in 
F. Capie et al., The Future ofCentral Banking. The Tercentenary Symposium oflhe Bank of 
England(Cambridge, 1994), pp. 1-91. 
34 M. Bordo, 'The LenderofLast Resort.Alternative Views andHistorical Experience', 
in C. Goodhart and G. Illing (eds), Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender q( Last 
Resorl. A Reader (Oxford, 2002), pp. 108-25. 
J5 B. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital (Princeton, 1996), pp. 35-8. 
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of sorne fonn of public supervision on banks with access to central bank's high­
powered money. In a similar vein, the central position held by central banks in the 
financial system and their network of correspondent balances with commercial 
banks made them the natural candidates to perfonn this new function. This pattem 
was not generalized, however (the Nordic countries, Switzerland and other small 
European countries fol1owed a different path), and gained momentum only after 
WW l. But, as Grossman shows, to establish when exactly central banks assumed 
supervisory responsibilities or when infonnal supervision tumed into fonnal 
powers proves as elusive and controversial as to detennine when their transition to 
modem central banking was completed. His empirical evidence also suggests that 
younger central banks created around the tum of the century were more likely to 
be invested with supervisory duties than their older counterparts, possibly because 
their organizational structure, ownership and management were more flexible and 
better able lo adjust lo new public tasks. 
by-producl oflhe public duties gradually assumed by cenlral banks in lhe early 
twentieth century was their role as monitors of the national economy, providers 
of statisttcal infonnation and advisers of economic policy-makers. In chapter 7, 
Pablo Martín Aceña and Teresa Tortella (Regulation and Supervision: The Rise 
ofCentral Banks'Research Departments) provide a timeline ofthe establishment 
of in-house Research Departments at European central banks and trace a parallel 
history of two of them in the interwar years, the 'Servizio studi econonomici e 
stalislici', al lhe Bank of Italy, and lhe 'Servicio de Estudios', al lhe Bank of 
Spain. 
The last quarter of the twentieth century has witnessed a major shift away 
from the long-established pattem of restricted financial systems towards financial 
globalizalion. By lhe early 1980s Iiberalization of capilal flows and deregulalion 
had risen to the top of the agenda of pol1cy-makers in a11 industrialized countries. 
Explaining why lhis happened is nol slraighlforward from a polilical-economy 
perspective. A popular idea among economists points to the impact of exogenous 
forces on the size of the rents generated by regulation to their initial beneficiaries. 
Technological progress, especially the dramatic reduction in the real cost of 
processing and transmitting infonnation, and associated financial innovations are 
usually mentioned as the most powerful agents of change in the financial sector. 
Kroszner and Strahan suggesl lhal new lechnologies in bolh deposil-laking and 
lending shifted lhe political balance of power from small banks towards growlh­
oriented large banks. 36 This is confinned by the fact that deregulation occurred 
earlier in states with fewer smal1 banks, in states where small banks were financially 
weak, and in states with more smaller and more bank-dependent finns. 
In fact. regulation itself was in sorne cases a driver of change. Govemment­
imposedconstraints. by reducing financial finns' utility. provided incentives forthem 
36 R.S. K.roszner and P.E. Strahan, 'What Orives Oeregulation? Economics and Politics 
oí the Relaxation ofBank Branching Restrictions', Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 114, 
4 (1999), pp. 1437--67. 
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to circurnvent regulation and for their unregulaled competitors to disintermediate 
them through product and process innovations. Innovations, in tum, either led to 
re-regulation, which may have entailed attempts to bring unregulated products 
or finns under the existing regulatory regime, or to a re]axation of constraints on 
regulated incumbents. The latter was especially like]y when change was too fast 
for regulators to keep pace with it and tended to bring Ihe regulated equilibrium 
clase lo the unregulated arre. This gave more influence lo pro-deregulation ¡nteres! 
groups and raised demand for deregulation by incumhents as well. 
This 'regulatory dialectic' was most evident in the USA.,7 HeTe, mutual savings 
banks, which were prevented by regulation from adjusting interest on deposits to 
unusually high and volatile interest rates, suffered from serious disintennediation 
in the 1960s and 70s in favour of unregulated institutions such as money market 
funds. The ensuing disruption of the mortgage market and the building industry 
created the conditions for the deregulation of thrifts and savings banks in 1980. 
Likewise, regulated commercial banks were increasingly disintennediated in 
their wholesale business by non-depository institutions and alternative markets 
(such as Treasury bonds and commercial paper). A first circumventing reaction 
was a product innovation, the Certificale ofDeposit (CDs), which US regulalory 
authorities then re-regulated. A second circumventing response was regulatory 
arbitrage. US banks 'invaded' the Cily ofLondon and used their foreign branches 
to intermediate dollar-denominated deposits and CDs - the so caBed Eurodollars. 
This became an unregulated intemational money market towards which British 
authorities maintained a hands-off attitude insofar as its activities remained 
confined to external intermediation (cross-currency and cross-country), with no 
impact on the external situation ofthe British pound, and regulation succeeded in 
keeping British banks largely out of the business. Again, US regulators responded 
to strategic toreign branching by introducing penalty reserve requirements on 
funds bOfTowed in londdh ..1~ 
The rise of pressure for deregulation gained momentum as from the ]980s. 
In the USA, time-honoured pillars of lhe old regulalory regime were eroded 
and finally brought down. Under the Depository lnstilutions Deregulalion and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Gam-St. Gennain Deposilory Institutions 
Act of 1982, ceilings on deposit interest rates were removed and the traditional 
37 E. Kane, 'Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing 
Effectiveness ofBanking Regulation', Journal of Pinance, 36, 2 (1981), pp. 355-67; and 
idem, 'Technological and Regulatory Forces in the Developing Fusion ofFlnancial-Services 
Competition', Journal ofFinance, 39, 3 (1984). pp. 759-72. 
3~ On the impact of regulation on the emergence of the Eurodollar market, see S. 
Battilossi and Y. Cassis (eds), European Banks ami rhe American Challenge. Competi/ion 
and Cooperation in lnternational Banking under Brerton Wood.... (Oxford, 2002); and 
especially R. Sylla, 'US Banks and Europe. Strategy and Altitudes', pp. 53-73. On the 
discussion among central bankers, G. Toniolo, Central Bank Cooperation at the Bankfor 
lnternational Settlements, 1930-1973 (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 452-7l. 
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banking system deregulated in order to promote competition. The Neal-Riegle 
lnterstate Banking Act of 1994, which had for lwenly years codified at national 
level the effect of state-Ievel deregulation, Iifted geographic restrictions on 
branching. Finally, the firewalls erected by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 belween commercial and inveslment 
banking and insurance companies were demolished (Gramm-Leah-BliIey Act 
of 1999). Again, federal legislation sanclioned what many slate legislatures and 
banking authorities had been increasingly allowing, by expanding banks' powers 
and paving the way for a returo to universal banking and the creation of giant 
financial conglomerates. J9 
In Westem Europe, equaIly profound changes took places both at national 
and regional levels. Competition was promoted and scope and scale in banking 
enhanced by removing 'conduct' regulations on interest rates and bank portfolios, 
as well as by gradually lifting restrictions on entry, branching, mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). ownership and activities in securities and insurance.4U 
Capital controls were Iifted earlier and more comprehensively in countries. such 
as the USA and West Germany. which had resorted to capital controls only as 
emergency devices in the turmoil of the mid- 1970s. Long-standing exchange and 
capital control s were also swiftly removed in the UK by 1979,41 On the Continent. 
liberalization was slowed down by macroeconomic adjustment and disinfiation in 
the first half ofthe I980s and conlro!s were, therefore. phased out more gradualIy 
and controversialIy. Countries such as Italy. Spain and Portugal only reluctantly 
accomplished fuIl financial hberalizalion in the early 1990s under the polilical 
pressure generated by the EU Single Market programme.42 National capital markets 
entered a phase of rapid expansion and deep institutional transformation. In the 
UK, the 'Big Bang" of 1986 precipilaled a sudden change in the microstructure of 
the London Stock Exchange against the interests and the restrictive practices of 
traditional incumbents rOld Boys') and in favour of foreign competitors.4~ This 
tumed the City into the world leading financial centre, while on the Continent, 
39 Federal Deposil Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Hl:'lfory oIthe 1980s. Lessonsfor 
the Future, vol. 1, An Examination ofthe Banking Crises ofthe 1980s and earfy 1990.'1 
(Washington, 1997), pp. 87-135. See also K. Spong, Banking Regulation. Its Purposes, 
Implementation and E/lec/s (Kansas City, 2000). 
40 For a survey, see E.P.M. Gardener and P. Molyneux, Changes in Western European 
Banking (London, 1994). 
41 R.e. Marston, International Financiallntegration. A Study oflnterest Difierentials 
between the Major Industrial Countries (Cambridge, ]995), pp. 43--69. 
42 A.F.P. Bakker, The Liberalization ofCapital Movements in Europe. The Monetary 
Commi//ee and FinancialIntegration, 1958-1994 (Dordrecht, Boston and London, 1996), 
pp. 147-212. 
43 R. Michie, The London Stock Exchange. A History (Oxford, 2001), pp. 543-95. 
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Paris. Frankfurt and Amsterdam a150 acquired a new intemational status and se! in 
moti00 a competitive dynamic.44 
The end of financiai restriction has brought prudential regulation to the 
fOTefront of policy-making again. But financiai globalization has al50 raised 
the challenging issues of regulatory convergence and competing regulatory 
jurisdictions, especially in Europe. Safety nets remain the result of paliey rules 
fonnulated and implemented mainly al national leve!. In the process of creating 
a Single Market for financial services, the second EU Banking Directive of 1989 
al10wed the hannonization of minimum standard prudential requirements. Since 
1992 most European cCluntries have adopted the so-called 'Basel l' agreement, 
a prudential regulatory framework based on minimum capital requirement 
approved in 1988 by the Base] Comminee on Banking Supervision at the Bank 
for International Settlements. Within the EU, the principie of mutual recognition 
has removed a11 regulatory barriers to the emergence of a single banking market 
and created a level playing field for universal bankingY At the same time, banking 
supet;'ision has remained decentralized in the hands of national regulators with 
very different approaches. Some central banks, in ltaly, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
and the Netherlands, have retained it, while other EU countries have opted for 
integrated financial sector regulators. Since the early 20th century. Sweden has 
had a single regulatory authority, the Royallnspectorate of Banks and Securities, 
exercising supervision of commercial banking, securities trading and stock­
exchange operations and since 1991 also incorporating supervision of insurance. 
This model was adopted by the UK in 2000, when the Financia] Service Authority, 
an independent and non-governmental body, took over banking supervision ffom 
the Bank of England, and financial-market regulation and supervision from the 
London Stock Exchange. Later, a similar pattem was adopted by Gerrnany, with 
the merger, in 2002, of the Federa] Banking Supervisory Office and the Federal 
Securities Supervisory Office into the newly created Federal Financia! Services 
Authority. 
A more fragmented situation has emerged in the regulation of financial 
markets. AH European countries have adopted new prudential regulation on 
disclosure, Iisting, Initia] Public Offerings (lPOs), M&A, and insider trading. 
The EU, through the Investment Service Directive of 1993, has allowed nationa] 
governments to keep their own legal and regulatory frameworks, hoping that 
mutual recognition would sutnce to deepen financia!-market integration. 
However, scope for regulatory arbitrage and competition has remained large, and 
44 W. Seifert et al., ElIropean Capital Markets (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 87-107. 
45 J.-P. Danthine, F. Giavazzi, X. Vives, E.L. von Thadden, Monitoring ElIropean 
Integration, vol. 9 (London. 1999); E.P.M. Gardener, P. Molynellx and J. Williarns, 
'Competitive Banking in the EU and Euroland', inA.W. Mullinellx and V. Murinde (eds), 
Handbook ofInternational Banking (Che1tenharn, 2003), pp. 130-55. 
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the transposition of EU directives into national laws has been extremely slow.4'" 
The Lamfalussy Report of 200] identified about 40 public authorities dealing 
with securities-market regulation and supervision, with mixed competences and 
different responsibilities. It also emphasized that the development of integrated 
European securities markets and the implementation of the mutual recognition 
system was being held up by the absence ofclear Europe-wide regulation on critical 
issues such as prospectuses, cross-border collateral, market abuse and investment 
service provision. It pointed to the lack of an agreed interpretatian of European 
rules and to ditTerences in bankruptcy andjudicial procedures. taxation, corporate 
govemance and competition policies, listing and disclosure requjrements, and 
takeover rules:47 
As a malter of fact, the widened geographic, functional and organizational 
scope ofsuppliers offinancial services has led to the emergence ofwhat Edward 
Kane has called 'an intemational market for financial service regulation' .48 On 
the one hand, rivalry between private and public suppliers of financial regulation 
across countries may have protected bOITowers, depositors and investors from the 
over-regulatian produced by a monopolistic supplier or a regulatory cartel. On 
the other, this fragmentation has also magnified the uncertainty about the size of 
implicit or explicit insurance subsidies guaranteed by nationa! parent authorities to 
increasingly intemationalized risk-bearing institutions. Any failure to meet these 
implicit guarantees cou!d dangerously shake confidence in the global financial 
architecture, lead to shrinking forcign trade in financial services and push 
governments back to old and new policies offinancial restriction. For this reason, 
aH players (both regu]ated and regulators) have a partia] community of interest in 
order to avoid financia! instability. 
Playing this kind of cooperative game has not proved an easy task, however. 
Indeed, in chapter 8, Catherine Schenk (The Regu!ation ofInternationa! Financia! 
Marketsfrom the [950s ro the !990s) shows, through the lenses ofUS and British 
records, how difficult and controversial it was for monetary and financial authorities 
of industrialized countries to find a common ground for a cooperative solution 
to the regulation and supervision of intemational banks. Early attempts were 
dominated in the 1960s and eariy 1970s by the discussion on how to bring under 
eontro] the unregulated Eurodollar market based in London, but operated main]y 
~6 See the papers collected in J.M. Kremers, D. Schoenmaker and P. Wierts (eds), 
Financial SlIpervision in ElIrope (Cheltenham, 2003); and in particular C. Goodhart, 'The 
Political Eeonomy of Financia1 Harmonization in Europe', pp. 129-38. 
47 Lamfalussy Report (Final Report oí the Cornmittee of Wise Men on the Reglllation 
ofEuropean Securities Markets), 15 February 2001, pp. 10-12. 
48 E. Kanc, 'Competitive Financia1 Reregulation. An (ntemationa1 Perspective', in 
R. Portes and A. Swoboda (eds), Threats 10 Inlernationa/ Financial Stability (Cambridge, 
1987), pp. 111--45; and idem, 'Tension between Competition and Coordination in 
Intemational Financial Regulation" in C. England (ed.), Governing Banldng~' Future. 
Markets vs Regulation (Boston, 1991), pp. 33--47. 
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by US and olher foreign banks. lhe debate generaled much heal bul virtuaIly no 
practica1 resulto 80th the US and British authorities reached the conclusion that the 
benefits (providing reliefto US banks and corporations in times of domestic credit 
stringency and enhancing London's status as an imemational financial centre) 
largely outweighed its inflationary potential and the destabilizing consequences 
of short-term capital flows. Subsequent debate among central bank officials at 
the Bank for Intemational Settlements on cooperative regulation and supervision 
of the Eurodollar rnarket and the provision of lender-of-last-resort facilities to 
intemational banks proved equally inconclusive. Only later, with the 'Concordals' 
of 1975 and 1983, did an agreement emerge regarding the division ofsupervisory 
responsibility 00 multinational banks between parent and hast authorities. The 
adoption oflhe Capital Adequacy Requiremenls issued by lhe Basel Committee in 
1987 (lhe so-called 'Basel 1') represenled lhe only cooperalive success in almosl 
lhirty years of attempls. Bul, as Piel Clemenl gloomily argues in chapler 9 (The 
Missing Link: Interna/lonal Banking Supervision in Ihe Archives ol (he BIS), 
historians interested in investigating the making of such agreements are likely to 
be denied access to most ofthe BIS records for a long time ahead 00 grounds of 
eonfidentiality and sensitivity. They will just have to content themselves with the 
background material released by the Basel Cornmittee. 
A general consensus exists that from the mid 19708, and in the wake of thirty 
years of unusual financia1 stability, the frequency of systemie or near-systemic 
banking erises has increased as a consequence of the process of deregulation and 
liberalization. This was ofien accompanied by serious currency crises and is not 
only true 01' developing eountries, but also of industrialized ones.49 Three of the 
'Big Five' systemie banking erises suffered by industrial economies took place in 
Europe and were preceded by financial líberalízalion: Norway in 1987 and Finland 
and Sweden in 199 J." lhe US Savings and Loans crises ofthe 1980s - an episode 
ol' comparable magnitude - also afTected a recently deregulated sector of the 
banking system. In aH these cases, competition induced deregulation and unsound 
practices and excess risk taking ensued, compounded by long expansionary eycles 
in asset prices. Their reversal eventually led to widespread losses and fadures, 
with governments obliged to intervene in order to bail out distressed financial 
institutions. Indeed, financia! liberalization seems to have brought about the re­
emergenee of boom and bust cyeles, with 10nger expansions in credit and asset 
priees, followed by sudden, disruptive contractions. Consumption and investment 
deeisions by no longer credit-constrained households and firms seems to have 
49 M. Bordo and B. Eichengreen, 'Is our Current International Economic Environment 
Unusually Crisis Prone?', in D. Gmen and L. Gower (eds). Capital Flows and the 
lnternational Financial System (Sydney, 1999), pp. 18-74. See also the papers included 
in G. Caprio, l.A. Hanson and R. Litan (eds), Financial Crises. Lessons from the Past, 
Preparationfor the Future (Washington OC, 2005). 
50 C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff, Bank.ing Crises. An Equal Opportunity Menace, NBER 
Working Paper no. 14587,2008. 
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responded, lo an unprecedenled exlenl, lo highly pro-cyclical perceplions ofweallh 
and risk. leading to a build-up of financial imbalances - that is, overextensions 
of private balance sheets - which eventually unwound under the pressure of 
confidence erises or ofmonetary intervention ofan anti-infiationary nature.31 
In the lasl chapler of lhe volume, Peler Englund and Vesa Vihrililli (Banking 
Crises in the Nor'h: A Comparalive Analysis ofFin/and and Sweden) dissect the 
dynamics of the Swedish and Finnish banking crises of lhe early 1990s. Bolh 
banking syslems emerged in lhe 1980s ÍÍ"om a long period oftight regulationjusl 
to enter a lending boom driven by increased bank competition, improved access to 
foreign 1'unds, inereased demand for credit by once credit-constrained households 
and smal! firms, and assel-price escalation. When in 1990-91 lhe cycle was 
reversed, asset prices began to faH and the boom turned into a bust, bringing down 
finan ce companies and banks heavily exposed to the housing market. However, 
Englund and Vihriala argue that the roots of the crises carmot be traeed baek 
exclusively to Iiberalization, weak supervision and excess risk-taking during the 
credit boom. In faet, the reversa1 was exacerbated by a combination ofexogenous 
shocks (such as lhe collapse ofthe Soviet Union market for Finnish exporters) and 
policy mistakes. In the case of Sweden. the mistake was the decision to defend the 
fixed exchange rale of lhe Krona during lhe lurmOlI of the EMS crisis of 1992. 
In lhe Finnish case, lhe decision to devalue (inslead of ftoaling) the Markka in 
1991 forced monetary authorities to keep interest rates high in order 10 defend the 
exchange rate from new speculative atlacks. The floating ofthe Markka was only 
delayed, bul the devaluation hil hard lhe foreign-currency debl of lhe corporale 
sector, infiicting further losses on the banking sector. 
At the present time, the world appears to be on the verge of a vast movement 
towards encompassing financial regulation. which will probably configure 
something akin to the Great Reversal which swept most eountries during the 
1920s and 1930s. A general need is nalurally fell for a cryslal ball in which lo read 
the signs regarding the nature and direction that matters in this respect are likeIy 
to take. Whether a policy-maker, a practitioner or just a member ofthe public, the 
attraetion of a voJume on the history offinancial regulation and de-regulation will 
lhus líe for many in lhe hope lhal lhe lessons of lhe pasl may be helpful in lrying 
to understand what this second Great Reversal is likely to contain. 
Can lhe knowledge gleaned from these chapters place one in a better position 
for predicting lhe shape of lhe financial worId and of lhe rules lhal will mould 
it? The safest answer is probably not. True, in retrospect it is evident from 
practically aH of lhese sludies that path dependence has been one of lhe mosl 
powerful infiuences over the secular course of relations between financial activity 
and lhe regulatory responses lhey elici!. Yet it is also clear lhal al each lum in lhis 
historícal process there is much also that is far from being time-invariant. New, 
31 C. Borio and P. Lowe, Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability. Exploring the 
Nexus, BIS Working Paper no. 114,2002; and C. Bono and A. Filardo, Back to the Future? 
Assessing the Deflation Record. BIS Working Paper no. 152, 2004. 
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never experienced circumstances incessantly arise thanks to human ingenuity 
in devising ways of reducing risk, gaining informational advantage. combining 
resources and creating and exploring technology. As society moves along Its 
course, at each crisis the combination of conditions is never the same as befare 
and the defensive response ofmarkets, ofinstitutions and ofsocicty as a whole is 
therefore always likely to be unexpected and even unexpectable. Past panerns 01' 
financial regulation conscquently do not evolve in linear fashion and extrapolation 
fram earlier experiences is a risky exercise. 
In lrying to grasp the future state of global and nalional finaneial systems, 
deiving into the past need not, however, be pointless. The chapters in this volume, 
although unlikely to supply a basis for rigorous projection from past trends 
and exact predictions. still provide useful and thought-provoking indications. 
They can suggest the sorts of events that trigger off the critical situations which 
eventually give rise to the necessity for regulatory swings - wars, of course, but, 
more frequentIy, jumps in technology, productivity changes, shifts in paradigms 
and perceptions, to name a few. Knowledge of previous experiences will point to 
the probable shape of corrective actions that may be expected from a particular 
conjugation of circumstances. It will also show that these politica1 outcomes are 
notjust the result ofa cool analysis ofthe facts. even when these are fully known. 
They can be powerfu11y shaped also by lhe heat and indignation released by publie 
debate and by ehanging popular pereeptions of whal is admissible behaviour 
in the realm of finance. In this perspective, it is not difficult to imagine that the 
coming wave of regulation wil1 not only be appropriate to current problems but 
will probably go loo far and last longer than neeessary, as well as following palhs 
which a dispassionate analyst would not have recommended. 
A final strand of thought suggested by this volume is that the finaneial world 
may be about to be entering waters less k.nown to us than on similar occasions 
before. For the i11s of globally inlegrated markels, obviously only global remedies 
will work. This means that in dealing with markets which have overreached 
themselves, lhe pasl is nol a partieularly helpful guide, a fael lhal is demonstraled 
by these studies, al1 ofthem essential1y national in character. Financial regulation 
and de-regulation has always been the work of sovereign states, even thollgh it 
has often been replicated across borders, as a result either of the inclination to 
emulate best practices or ofthe need to compete institutionally with rival systems 
in other countries. An intense reversal of the vast sweep of de-regulation of the 
last two decades, such as is now expected, is therefore a novel experience. The 
scarcity of significant precedents for supra-national solutions in a domain where 
sovereignty has always dominated points to a large area ofuncertainty ahead and 
to a considerable seope for regulalory and poljJieal erealivity. It is likely that whal 
is in store then is an entirely new regulatory era, which. on past showing, will 
undoubtedly last for at least one or two generations befare another Great Reversal 
makes its presence felt. 
CHAPTER 1 
'Conservative abroad, liberal at horne': 
British Banking Regulation during the 
Nineteenth Century 
Philip L. Coltre11 
The British government was the first to encounter the 'modern' problem 01' 
banking regulation. Two aspects - what should constitute the cover for banknotes, 
coupled with which institutions should be permitted to have circulations -led lo 
lhe stipulalions of lhe Bank Charter Aet of 1844. The preeeding debale between 
various protagonists ofthe 'Curreney Sehool' and the 'Banking Sehool' has been 
well explored by economists and historians. l Far less scholarly attention has been 
paid lo lhe equally subslantial parallel diseussion eoncemed wilh regulaling both 
the fonnatíon and business of joint-stock banks, which also ultimately resulted 
in legislation by Sir Robert Peel in 1844 - the Joinl Sloek Banking Aet.' lbi, 
chapter considers the path leading to that statute, which involved sorne transferof 
the authoríties' growing experience ofregulating chartered colonial banks during 
the 1830s to joint-stock banks in the metropolitan economy. lt a1so reviews why 
lhe authorities gave up the regulation ofdomeslie joint-stoek banks between 1851 
and 1862. and the 1Iltimate consequences that this surrender had for the colonial 
banking regulations. 
The central issues that carne to lhe fore fmm lhe early 1820s were: establishing 
resilient banks, and providing safeguards for their proprietors and those amongst 
theír customers who held their notes but increasingly were their depositors. 
From 1711 until 1821 lhe British Stale stood baek from intervening in \he 
burgeoníng formalized provision of banking services. 3 lts benign stance was 
1 The c1assíe study ís F.W. Fetter, Development ofBritish Monetary Orthodoxy 1797­
1875 (Cambridge MA, 1965), to which should be added L.S. Pressnell, 'Gold Re,erves, 
Bank.ing Reserves and the Baríng Crisis of 1890', in C.R. Whittlesey and J.S.G. Wilson 
(eds), Essays in Money and Banking in HonourofR.S. Sayers (Oxford, 1968). 
2 There have been only two major scholarIy considerations: S.E. Thomas, The Rise 
and Growth ofJoínl Stock Banking, vol. 1, Brítain: lo 1860 (London, 1934); and K.S. 10ft, 
•AMid-century Attempt at Banking Control', Revue Internationaled'Histoire de la Banque. 
3 (1970), pp. 149-67. 
3 Thc authorative analysis is that of L.S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford, 1956); but see also R. Cameron, 'England 1750-1844', in R Cameron 
